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Of course a settlement of a controversy on a fundamentally wrong
principle of law is greatly to be deplored, but there must of necessity
be many rules governing the relations between members of the same
society that are more important in that their establishment creates a
known rule of action than that they proceed on one principle or
another.
-Chief Justice William Howard Taft'
I. INTRODUCTION
When passing upon the validity of predetermined contractual dis-
pute resolution provisions, judges may think of a continuum. At one
extreme sits absolute contractual freedom to specify the adjudicator,
forum, and what law will govern in the event of a dispute. At the other
extreme rests a complete inability to avoid a United States court.2 Some-
where in the foggy center, yet closer to this second extreme, exists a rule
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, University of Miami School of Law. The author would like to
thank Paul Friedland, Kirsten Odynski, Marc J. Goldstein, and Alan Rau for their stimulating blog
posts which prompted the idea for this note. The author would like to thank Professor Jan
Paulsson for his guidance, and his family and friends, particularly Melissa Ackert, for their
unwavering support.
1. RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 193 (Suzy Platted., 1993).
2. See, e.g., Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government,
54 YALE L.J. 36 (1944).
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providing for the invalidation of all contractual dispute resolution speci-
fications upon one party's assertion that he or she would prefer to seek a
remedy under United States law.3 Such a rule might signal to other states
that the United States believes its own laws to be morally, logically, and
economically superior, as well as sufficient to remedy much of the
world's evils. Indeed, there has been judicial recognition that this type of
extraterritorial signal is not desirable-the Supreme Court has warned
that the United States "cannot have trade and commerce in world mar-
kets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our
laws, and resolved in our courts."4
Nevertheless, Thomas v. Carnival Corp.,' decided July 1, 2009,
evidences that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with the
appropriateness of such a rule. In Thomas, the Eleventh Circuit held an
arbitration clause "null and void" which provided for disputes to be
resolved under Panamanian law because enforcement of the clause
would cause the plaintiff, a seaman, to forfeit his right to seek a remedy
under the Seaman's Wage Act.6 In doing so, the court relied on dicta
from Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. and
Vimar Seguros y Reasequros v. MV Sky Reefer, which provide that
"[w]ere there no subsequent opportunity for review and were we per-
suaded that 'the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in
tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory
remedies ... we would have little difficulty in condemning the agree-
ment as against public policy.' "" This note contends that the Eleventh
Circuit decided Thomas wrongly.
Carnival Cruise Lines employed Puliyurumpil Mathew Thomas, a
citizen and resident of India, as a head waiter on the Carnival Imagina-
3. See Posting of Paul Friedland & Kirsten Odynski, to KluwerArbitrationBlog, http://
kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/08/26/eleventh-circuit-troubled-by-choice-of-law-not-
choice-of-arbitration-in-thomas-v-carnival/#conmment-7705 (Aug. 26, 2009).
4. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). See also Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (quoting MIS Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9) (stating that
invalidating "[ain agreement to arbitrate before a specified [international] tribunal .... would...
reflect a 'parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.').
Accord Thomas Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MiAMi L. REv. 773,
828 (2002) ("It is a serious mistake to assess transborder adjudicatory frameworks through myopic
domestic eyes.").
5. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113 (11 th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1157
(2010).
6. Id. at 1124.
7. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. MN Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985))
(ellipsis in original).
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tion.8 The Imagination flew a Panamanian flag of convenience. 9 Thomas
agreed, by signing his Seafarer's Agreement, to arbitrate under "the laws
of the flag of the vessel .... notwithstanding any claims for negligence,
unseaworthiness, maintenance, cure, failure to provide prompt, proper
and adequate medical care, wages, personal injury, or property damage
which might be available under the laws of any other jurisdiction."'"
On November 8, 2004, in the ship's dining room, Thomas slipped,
fell, and dropped a coffee pot." Thomas sustained injuries to his spine
and shoulder and burned his leg.' 2 Thomas then sued in Florida state
court on the bases of inadequate maintenance and cure under general
United States maritime law, negligence under the Jones Act,'3 and fail-
ure to pay wages under the Seaman's Wage Act.
14
Below, Carnival filed a notice of removal to federal court and
moved to compel arbitration.' 5 The District Court granted both motions,
finding that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention" or "Convention")
applied "and that the arbitration provision of the Seafarer's Agreement
was enforceable."' 6 On appeal, after determining at some length which
of Thomas's claims fell under which of his two seafarer's agreements
(only the later agreement contained an arbitration clause),' 7 the Eleventh
8. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1115-16; Joseph R. Brubaker, The Prospective Waiver of a Statutory
Claim Invalidates an Arbitration Clause: The Eleventh Circuit Decision in Thomas v. Carnival
Corp., 19 AM. REv. INr'L ARB. 309, 315 (2009); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Carnival
Corp. v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 1157 (2010) (No. 09-646), 2009 WL 4402888, at *3.
9. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1116.
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at *4-5. The arbitration clause at issue also
provided that conflicts of law rules under the laws of the flag state would not apply. Id.
11. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2009).
12. Id.
13. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2000). "The Jones Act confers on seamen the statutory right to sue
their employers in an American court for the negligence of fellow crew members." Thomas, 573
F.3d at 1115 n.1.
14. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1115 & n.3. In pertinent part, the Seaman's Wage Act provides "[a]t
the end of a voyage, the master shall pay each seaman the balance of wages due the seaman within
24 hours after the cargo has been discharged or within 4 days after the seaman is discharged,
whichever is earlier." 46 U.S.C. § 10313(f) (2000). The Act also makes provision for penalty
wages by requiring "[wihen payment is not made as provided under subsection (f) of this section
without sufficient cause, the master or owner shall pay to the seaman 2 days' wages for each day
payment is delayed." 46 U.S.C. § 10313(g) (2000).
15. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1115.
16. Id. Specifically, the District Court conducted a four-step inquiry to ensure that jurisdiction
under the New York Convention existed: "[T]here existed a written contract to arbitrate; the
agreement provided for arbitration in the territory of a signatory to the Convention; the agreement
arose out of a legal commercial relationship, and a party to the agreement was not a United State
[sic] citizen." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Carnival Corp. v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 1157
(2010) (No. 09-646), 2009 WL 4402888, at *6; 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2000). See also Bautista v. Star
Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1294 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005).
17. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1118-20 (11th Cir. 2009). The court held that
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Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court, and in relevant part
held that compelling arbitration amounted to an impermissible prospec-
tive waiver of the part of Thomas's Seaman's Wage Act claim that was
"covered under the New Agreement" because Panamanian law would
indisputably apply."8 On December 1, 2009, Carnival filed a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, framing the issue posed as "[w]hether an agreement
to arbitrate that is otherwise enforceable under the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards is per se void
and unenforceable as to a U.S. statutory claim because it requires appli-
cation of foreign law."' 9 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on Janu-
ary 19, 2010.20
Part II of this note will provide a brief historical overview of "pro-
spective waiver" doctrine by virtue of a choice-of-law clause since its
creation in Mitsubishi, and will attempt to explain how this doctrine fits
into the structure of the terms of the New York Convention. Part III will
portray the "prospective waiver" doctrine in a positive light. Part IV
will analyze the Thomas court's application of this doctrine through its
reliance on Mitsubishi and Vimar, and its reconcilability with prior cases
which have allowed seaman's claims to proceed to arbitration. Part V
will examine if the Thomas court should have considered whether a sim-
ilar or equivalent remedy existed under Panamanian law, in addition to
unintended consequences Thomas will likely create. Part VI will scruti-
nize the Thomas court's assertion that Thomas would have no subse-
quent opportunity for review in a United States court. Part VII will
dissect the decision's implicit assumption that all individual federal rem-
edies possess equivalent normative societal value. Part VIII then
assumes that normative societal value is an appropriate consideration for
courts to consider when deciding whether to invalidate an arbitration
clause and seeks to establish a modest hierarchy of the social value of
various federal statutory rights. This hierarchy suggests appropriate
levels of scrutiny for federal courts to consider based on the content of
the substantive right that would otherwise be lost (or was lost if at the
enforcement stage). It then seeks to discern the relative normative value
"the Jones Act negligence claim, the unseaworthiness claim, the maintenance and cure claim, and
part of the Seaman's Wage Act claim (as it pertains to any obligations incurred before October 10,
2005) d[id] not fall under the Convention" because they only arose in connection with the first
seafarer's agreement, which did not contain an arbitration clause. Id. at 1120. This note does not
take issue with this part of the Thomas decision.
18. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1120, 1123-24.
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Carnival Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1157 (No. 09-646), 2009
WL 4402888, at *9.
20. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1157
(2010).
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of the Seaman's Wage Act in order to find its appropriate place within
the hierarchy.
This note's core argument is that the Eleventh Circuit in Thomas
erred in two fundamental ways. First, the court erred by failing to con-
sider arbitration's potential to protect Thomas's rights under the Sea-
man's Wage Act. The court's public policy concerns would be
unfounded if Panamanian law provided a similar remedy to that offered
by the Seaman's Wage Act, the arbitrator would decide that application
of the Seaman's Wage Act was mandatory, or the arbitrator would con-
sider the claim on any other grounds. Second, the court erred by mud-
dling whether U.S. courts would have an opportunity to review the
fairness, as well as substantive compliance with U.S. public policy, of
the arbitral proceedings.2"
I. THE NEW YORK CONVENTION ACT AND THE PROSPECTIVE
WAIVER DICTA
The United States is a party to the New York Convention, and
Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (title 9 of the United States
Code) integrates its provisions.22 The Convention and subsequent
Supreme Court jurisprudence establish an "emphatic federal policy in
favor of arbitral dispute resolution,"23 and some believe that this "trend
favoring the arbitrability of disputes involving public policy issues is
justified. '2 4 Article II of the Convention controls the validity of arbitra-
tion agreements, and allows U.S. courts to refuse to honor an arbitration
agreement if the agreement is "null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed."25 It also intimates that any agreement to arbitrate
must "concern[] a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 26
21. See infra Parts V-VI.
22. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2000); Brubaker, supra note 8, at 313.
23. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1 (1972).
24. Homayoon Arfazadeh, In the Shadow of the Unruly Horse: International Arbitration and
the Public Policy Exception, 13 AM. Rv. INT'L ARE. 43, 56 (2002) ("Arbitration can no longer be
perceived as a tolerated encroachment upon the state's monopoly over justice, but as the ordinary
means of resolving international commercial disputes. As a matter of fact, arbitration seems to
afford parties to an international transaction a level of legal protection and security equal to, if not
greater than, that offered by state courts."). But see Jane VanLare, From Protectionism to
Favoritism: The Federal Policy Toward Arbitration Vis-a-Vis Competing State Policies, 11 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 473 (2006) (viewing increased arbitrability of seaman's claims in a negative
light).
25. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 11(3),
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519; Brubaker, supra note 8, at 313.
26. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note
25, at 2519.
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Only Article V, which actually governs recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards (not the validity of agreements), addresses "public
policy."27
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. signaled
the end of an era which had immunized statutory remedies from being
adjudicated by arbitrators.28 The case involved a distributor agreement
between a Japanese automobile manufacturer (Mitsubishi) and a Puerto
Rican automobile dealership (Soler) .29 The agreement's arbitration pro-
vision provided that disputes would be resolved in Japan under the
"rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Associa-
tion."3° After alleging, inter alia, that Soler failed to pay for a chiliad of
cars, Mitsubishi filed a complaint in U.S. District Court and sought to
compel arbitration.3" Soler counter-claimed and avowed causes of action
under the Sherman Act.3 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to "con-
sider whether an American court should enforce an agreement to resolve
antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an inter-
national transaction."33
Writing "absent such compelling considerations [as 'fraud or over-
whelming economic power'], the Act itself provides no basis for disfa-
voring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise
hospitable inquiry into arbitrability," '34 Justice Blackmun held the arbi-
tration agreement encompassing the antitrust counterclaims enforce-
27. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note
25, at 2520.
28. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 803, 821 (2009).
29. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1985).
30. Id. at 617.
31. Id. at 618-19 & n.2.
32. Id. at 619-20. The Sherman Act begins at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
33. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 624.
34. Id. at 627. It is noteworthy that the Mitsubishi court qualified this fervent pro-arbitration
language with the following:
That is not to say that all controversies implicating statutory rights are suitable for
arbitration. There is no reason to distort the process of contract interpretation,
however, in order to ferret out the inappropriate. Just as it is the congressional
policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act that requires courts liberally to
construe the scope of arbitration agreements covered by that Act, it is the
congressional intention expressed in some other statute on which the courts must
rely to identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be
held unenforceable.... We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive
protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the
right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative
history. Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue.
Id. at 627-28 (citations omitted).
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able.
Mitsubishi created the "prospective waiver" doctrine during its
analysis. After establishing that arbitration can reach federal statutory
claims, the Mitsubishi court turned to the question of whether "Soler's
antitrust claims are nonarbitrable even though it has agreed to arbitrate
them."36 Noting the "need of the international commercial system for
predictability in the resolution of disputes" and that its prior case law
"establish a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of freely negoti-
ated contractual choice-of-forum provisions," the Mitsubishi court
turned to tearing apart the purported sanctity of the antitrust laws.37 With
respect to this "fundamental importance," the court stated:
The importance of the private damages remedy, however, does
not compel the conclusion that it may not be sought outside an Amer-
ican court.
There is no reason to assume at the outset that international arbi-
tration will not provide an adequate mechanism. . . .The tribunal,
however, is bound to effectuate the intentions of the parties. Where
the parties have agreed that the arbitral body is to decide a defined set
of claims which includes, as in these cases, those arising from the
application of American antitrust law, the tribunal therefore should be
bound to decide that dispute in accord with the national law giving
rise to the claim.38
The Mitsubishi court then laid down footnote nineteen, which
reads, in its entirety:
In addition to the clause providing for arbitration before the
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association, the Sales Agreement
includes a choice-of-law clause which reads: "This Agreement is
made in, and will be governed by and construed in all respects
according to the laws of the Swiss Confederation as if entirely per-
formed therein." The United States raises the possibility that the arbi-
tral panel will read this provision not simply to govern interpretation
of the contract terms, but wholly to displace American law even
where it otherwise would apply. The International Chamber of Com-
merce opines that it is "conceivable, although we believe it unlikely,
that the arbitrators could consider Soler's affirmative claim of
anticompetitive conduct by CISA and Mitsubishi to fall within the
purview of this choice-of-law provision, with the result that it would
be decided under Swiss law rather than the U.S. Sherman Act." At
oral argument, however, counsel for Mitsubishi conceded that Ameri-
35. Id. at 639.
36. Id. at 628.
37. Id. at 628, 631.
38. Id. at 635-37.
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can law applied to the antitrust claims and represented that the claims
had been submitted to the arbitration panel in Japan on that basis. The
record confirms that before the decision of the Court of Appeals the
arbitral panel had taken these claims under submission.
We therefore have no occasion to speculate on this matter at this
stage in the proceedings, when Mitsubishi seeks to enforce the agree-
ment to arbitrate, not to enforce an award. Nor need we consider now
the effect of an arbitral tribunal's failure to take cognizance of the
statutory cause of action on the claimant's capacity to reinitiate suit
in federal court. We merely note that in the event the choice-of-forum
and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver
of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations,
we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as
against public policy.39
Thus, by speculating that, at some point in the future, contractual
dispute resolution specifications could bar a party from asserting U.S.
statutory causes of action, Mitsubishi created the "prospective waiver"
doctrine. While to this author it is not overly problematic, this infamous
final sentence of footnote nineteen does seem to confuse Articles II and
V of the New York Convention by expressly referencing "public pol-
icy ' 4° in connection with the validity of an agreement to arbitrate,
though the "prospective waiver" doctrine can be read in conjunction
with the language of the Convention in multiple ways. Under Article
II(1), this dictum can be read to suggest that any contractual waiver of a
federally created statutory remedy, where the remedy should otherwise
apply, is not a "subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration." Or,
under Article 11(3), Mitsubishi may have been prospectively pronounc-
ing that the Supreme Court would simply consider such a contractual
waiver "null and void."'" Alternatively, the Supreme Court was likely
39. Id. at 637 n.19 (citations omitted).
40. See Brubaker, supra note 8, at 313 ("[I]n parallel to the observation of leading
commentators that arbitral awards arising out of disputes deemed non-arbitrable under Article
11(3) are unenforceable under Article V(2)(a), the decision of the Eleventh Circuit [in Thomas]
appears to conclude that all arbitration agreements that violate public policy under Article V(2)(b)
are invalid under Article II."). But see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17-18, Carnival Corp. v.
Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 1157 (2010) (No. 09-646), 2009 WL 4402888, at *17-*18. The arbitration
clause at issue also provided that conflicts of law rules under the laws of the flag state would not
apply. Id. (arguing that this confusion between Article II and Article V of the Convention
constitutes a grave error and that "Article II's 'null and void' clause encompasses only those
situations, such as fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver that can be applied neutrally on an
international scale.").
41. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note
25, at 2519. This entire discussion raises the question whether the Mitsubishi dictum is akin to an
advisory opinion and problems of lower courts' reliance on dicta generally. U.S. CoNsT. art. I1,
§ 2; RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEM 54, 56 (6th ed. 2009).
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aware that "public policy" existed as a defense to the enforcement of an
award in the Convention, but just chose to apply it to an agreement to
arbitrate.
Setting this confusion aside, and more important from a historical
perspective, "many courts confronted with the Mitsubishi footnote have
found it inapplicable."42 For instance, the Ninth Circuit has opined "we
do not believe dictum in a footnote regarding antitrust law outweighs the
extended discussion and holding in Scherk [v. Alberto-Culver Co.] on
the validity of clauses specifying the forum and applicable law."'4 3 The
Fifth Circuit has stated that the footnote, "by its own terms, is limited to
the antitrust context, as is Mitsubishi more generally."' The Tenth Cir-
cuit in Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd. similarly refused to
"read Mitsubishi as restrictively as plaintiff when Mitsubishi is viewed
against the backdrop of Supreme Court decisions in the area."'4 5 The
Sixth and Second Circuits have taken similar approaches.46
The Supreme Court decided Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v.
M/V Sky Reefer47 a decade later. Vimar involved a cargo owner suing a
shipper under a bill of lading over damaged oranges.48 The "contract
evidenced by or contained in [the] Bill of Lading [was to be] governed
by Japanese law."' 4 9 The Supreme Court quickly dispensed with the
cargo owner's first argument that "a foreign arbitration clause lessens
... liability by increasing the transaction costs of obtaining relief," cit-
ing a "difference ... between explicit statutory guarantees and the pro-
cedure for enforcing them," the fact that "there would be no principled
basis for distinguishing national from foreign arbitration clauses," that
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA") is based on an interna-
tional convention, and other benefits of international comity in an era of
vastly increased international business transactions." Turning to the
choice-of-law question, the Vimar court enforced the arbitration clause
because:
[I]t [was] not established what law the arbitrators will apply to peti-
42. Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 596 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D.D.C. 2009); Brubaker, supra note 8, at
317.
43. Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1998), noted in Grynberg,
596 F. Supp. 2d at 78 n.2.
44. Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 968 (5th Cir. 1997), noted in Grynberg, 596 F.
Supp. 2d at 78 n.2.
45. Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 957 (10th Cir. 1992), noted
in Grynberg, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 78 n.2.
46. Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1995); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's,
996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993).
47. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
48. Id. at 530-31.
49. Id. at 531.
50. Id. at 534-38.
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tioner's claims or that petitioner will receive diminished protection as
a result. The arbitrators may conclude that COGSA applies of its own
force or that Japanese law does not apply so that, under another
clause of the bill of lading, COGSA controls.5
Notwithstanding intervening cases like Riley, the Vimar court then
repeated Mitsubishi's footnote nineteen, altering it slightly by adding
"[w]ere there no subsequent opportunity for review" and replacing "for
antitrust violations" with an ellipsis,52 arguably limiting the efficacy of
the argument that footnote nineteen could be easily brushed off as lim-
ited to antitrust violations.
Hence, with regards to the place of the "prospective waiver" doc-
trine in the Convention, Vimar does not provide much supplemental
clarity, although the addition of "no subsequent opportunity for review"
might suggest that the Supreme Court did realize it was attempting to
operate within Article V, or at least reflects an understanding that this
doctrine does not fit nicely within either Article II or Article V.
III. ON SUPPORT FOR THE PROSPECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE
The "prospective waiver" doctrine is far from indefensible. Where
Congress has directed that particular persons should have a right to seek
a remedy in the federal courts, and such a remedy has survived the
gamut of the legislative process, the deprivation of this right is not to be
taken lightly. Democratically elected bodies have discerned the exis-
tence of a void, and determined that the endowment of a legal entitle-
ment on a distinct class is required to plug the hole. So it makes sense
that two parties, especially where the endowed party is systemically
barred from freely negotiating alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
and the law to be applied therein, should be inhibited in their ability to
simply contract around this entitlement. More pointedly, shouldn't a
party with significant advantages in sophistication and general bargain-
ing power be explicitly prevented by law from effectively depriving the
weaker party from vindicating his or her right to sue in court by virtue of
forcing the weaker party to arbitrate under a law which does not contain
the right?
In accordance with this philosophy, Thomas makes perfect sense.
Since 1790, Congress has recognized that seamen, owing to their vulner-
51. Id. at 540.
52. Id. See also Posting of Marc J. Goldstein to Marc J. Goldstein Arbitration Commentaries,
http://arbblog.lexmarc.us/2009/07/us-public-policy-as-basis-to-nuilify-arbitration-agreement-
beyond-the-bounds-of-mitsubishi (July 7, 2009) (noting that Thomas inherited the ellipsis from
Vimar, and that the ellipsis creates the impression that the prospective waiver doctrine applies to
all "federally-created statutory remedies" rather than remedies of "fundamental public policy.").
1450 [Vol. 64:1441
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ability to ship owners, require unique legal protections.53 Three decades
later, the Supreme Court opined that seamen "are easily overreached,"
are treated similar to "young heirs," "are considered as placed under the
dominion and influence of men, who have naturally acquired a mastery
over them," and as such, "the most rigid scrutiny is instituted into the
terms of every contract, in which they engage." 54 Thus, Congress fash-
ioned the Seaman's Wage Act as an additional protection for this sus-
ceptible group, with the goal that it would deter ship owners from
unreasonably withholding wages-and where wages were unreasonably
withheld, seamen could go to court and do something about it.55 To
allow an employer such as Carnival to deprive a seaman of his wage
claim by compelling mandatory arbitration thus undermines the legisla-
tive mandate, which determined a significant public need. In turn, the
societal void which prompted Congress to create the remedy in the first
place would remain empty. Invalidating an arbitration clause, then, in
which "the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operate[] in tan-
dem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory reme-
dies"" on public policy grounds preserves a right which the structures
bequeathed with the public trust thought to be very important. This is the
primary ground on which the "prospective waiver" doctrine can be
defended.
But, this proverbial "void" need not remain empty if arbitration is
compelled in all cases. Put differently, it is possible for arbitration to
preserve the original purpose for the legislative endowment on the
facially weaker class. Fairness and compliance with substantive public
policy can be achieved in at least two ways: First, if the arbitral proceed-
ing itself will preserve the legal entitlement, the public need determined
by the legislature can still be fulfilled. Second, and not unrelated, if
courts in the state where the right exists have an opportunity to review
whether the arbitrators gave consideration to the right, the previous
"hole" determined by the legislature can remain filled also.
IV. THOMAS'S APPLICATION OF PRECEDENT
Neither Mitsubishi nor Vimar demand the result reached by the
Eleventh Circuit in Thomas. First, opining about "prospective waivers"
was not necessary to decide either dispute. Consequently, Thomas's reli-
53. U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 357 (1971); Ryan C. Davis, Note,
Shutting the Courthouse Door: The Ninth Circuit in Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line Finds
No Exceptions for Seafarers in Arbitration Provisions, 34 Ttw. MAR. L.J. 365, 366 (2009).
54. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047). See also Davis,
supra note 53, at 366.
55. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (2000).
56. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
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ance on these dicta is strained because the Supreme Court in both Mit-
subishi and Vimar allowed the disputes before it to proceed to
arbitration. Thus, the Thomas court's decision rested solely on what the
Supreme Court said it would do if faced with different facts. Since there
can be no certainty that the Supreme Court would have acted in accor-
dance with its prior dicta (even if it is assumed that the arbitration agree-
ment before the Supreme Court unquestionably and unequivocally
removed all possibility that U.S. law would apply), the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision is not supported by law. Indeed, the Thomas court itself
recognized that "[t]he Supreme Court itself has not been confronted with
an arbitration clause that would act as a prospective waiver,"57 and
instead preferred to find lower court decisions that struck down arbitra-
tion agreements persuasive.
"The implications of Mitsubishi are an enduring mystery .. .
Even so, the Thomas court's intensive reliance on Mitsubishi can be
viewed as exceedingly suspect, primarily because, on the whole, it can-
not be definitively determined that the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi was
truly concerned with the choice-of-law problem. Three points demon-
strate this. First, the parties in Mitsubishi "agreed that the arbitral body
[was] to decide a defined set of claims," and the Court stated that "the
tribunal therefore should be bound to decide that dispute in accord with
the national law giving rise to the claim. 59 It is chiefly for this reason
that the dicta relied on by Thomas was relegated to a footnote: Despite
the Swiss choice-of-law clause in Mitsubishi, which did not seem to nec-
essarily apply to the exclusion of all other law, the parties agreed to
arbitrate under the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Associa-
tion and submitted the antitrust claims to that association with the under-
standing that U.S. law would apply.6" Thus, put differently, the choice-
of-law problem in Mitsubishi can properly be viewed as a "done deal"
that the Court chose not to spend excessive time on. It was not extraordi-
narily important in itself, as Thomas stated it was, that "U.S. statutory
rights . . . were . . . not being ignored or violated but specifically
protected."
61
Second, the Mitsubishi court noted in footnote nineteen that the
International Chamber of Commerce believed it to be "conceivable,"
although "unlikely," that Swiss law would apply to Soler's claim, yet
57. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1123 n.16 (11th Cir. 2009).
58. Adam 1. Sulkowski, Through the Looking Glass: What a Comparison with the New Polish
Legal Framework ofArbitration Reveals about the U.S. Legal Framework of Arbitration, 7 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 87, 100 (2008).
59. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37.
60. Id. at 617, 637 n.19.
61. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1121.
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that Mitsubishi conceded that American law would apply to the antitrust
claim.62 This alone does not clearly and necessarily evince a belief that
nonapplication of U.S. law would be contrary to public policy in all
arbitrations of statutory claims. Rather, these sentences combine to sim-
ply show that, for the time being, the Supreme Court was placated, and
provided a basis for not addressing the choice-of-law issue head-on.
And third, Mitsubishi expressly reserved passing upon whether a
choice-of-law clause in an arbitration provision that prevented a party
from pursuing U.S. statutory remedies were categorically forbidden,
stating "[w]e therefore have no occasion to speculate on this matter at
this stage in the proceedings ..... , Even if footnote nineteen can be
read to indicate an extremely serious concern in this regard, the concern
would be applicable outside the context of a claim under the antitrust
laws, at least in the decade between Mitsubishi and Vimar.
The same cannot be so easily said of Vimar, as the Supreme Court
in that case addressed this issue head-on, noting the prospect that the
Japanese arbitrators would not apply COGSA "raise[d] a concern of sub-
stance."6 4 But as already noted, the Court held that "the choice-of-law
question... must be decided in the first instance by the arbitrator," since
at the time of the decision "it [was] not established what law the arbitra-
tors will apply .... -6 Again, then, while the Court quoted Mitsubishi's
"prospective waiver" phrase, Vimar need not stand for the bold proposi-
tion that no U.S. statutory right can be waived by virtue of a foreign
choice-of-law clause, in particular because COGSA, the statute at issue
in Vimar, expressly provided that liability for loss or damaged goods
could not be contractually limited.66 To the contrary, the Seaman's
Wage Act contains no provision invoked by Thomas as a justification
for awarding it special treatment, though it does provide that "[t]he
courts are available to the seaman for the enforcement of this section. 6 7
If this provision were cited by the Thomas court, the brittleness of its
analytical structure would be lessened.68
Another problem with the Thomas court's reliance on Vimar is that
in Vimar itself, its assertion that U.S. law might apply is somewhat con-
clusory, particularly because the bill of lading at issue in Vimar stated
62. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
63. Id.
64. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995).
65. Id. at 540-41 (citation omitted).
66. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 30704 (2006).
67. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (2000).
68. However, a conflict would be created with Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 488 F.3d 891
(11 th Cir. 2007). See infra text accompanying notes 74-79.
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explicitly that Japanese law would apply. 69 This aside (and largely irrel-
evant to this note because Vimar remains law that the Eleventh Circuit
could not disregard), more problematic is simply the fact that Vimar
"leaves in doubt the validity of choice-of-law clauses."7 What is clear is
that Vimar undoubtedly "marked a change in the jurisprudence of the
United States with respect to foreign arbitration clauses,"71 by effec-
tively switching the presumption associated with them from "presump-
tively invalid" to "presumptively valid."72 Aside from this level of
deference which the Thomas court ignored, Vimar's failure to take a
more audacious stance on the issue of subject-matter arbitrability, while
it would be dicta, should have prevented the Thomas court from striking
down the arbitration clause on the basis of a decision which held the
resolution of this issue to be "premature."73
Moreover, while Thomas can be reconciled procedurally with prior
Eleventh Circuit precedent, it conflicts with the policies underlying pre-
vious holdings in the Circuit. In Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises Inc.," the
Eleventh Circuit held that the New York Convention as implemented by
Congress superseded the right of a seaman to resolve wage disputes in
federal court under the Seaman's Wage Act.75 Prior to Lobo, in Bautista
v. Star Cruises, the Eleventh Circuit determined via statutory textual
analysis that "the plain language of the Convention Act precludes appli-
cation of the exemption for seamen's employment agreements ... 76
While neither Lobo nor Bautista are facially inconsistent with Thomas,
they do combine to demonstrate that federal protection for seamen from
being compelled to arbitrate is much more limited than once thought.
77
69. Vimar, 515 U.S. at 531.
70. Id. at 549 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Aaron A. Radicke, Comments, Strange Ways: COGSA, The Action In Rem, and Sky
Reefer's Progeny, 32 TuL. MAR. L.J. 203, 203 (2007).
72. Id.
73. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995).
74. Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 488 F.3d 891 (11 th Cir. 2007).
75. Id. at 895-96 ("[T]o nullify the arbitration provision here would be to hinder the purpose
of the Convention and subvert congressional intent.").
76. Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The
exemption referred to exists in the Federal Arbitration Act and provides "nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). See also Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 117 (2001) (holding the § I exemption confined to
transportation workers).
77. See generally Jarred Pinkston, New York's Unwelcoming Harbor: The New York
Convention's Inapplicability to Claims Arising From Seamen's Employment, 3 B.Y.U. INT'L L. &
MGMT. REV. 233 (2007). Accord Matthew Nickson, Comment, Closing U.S. Courts to Foreign
Seamen: The Judicial Excision of the FAA Seamen's Arbitration Exemption from the New York
Convention Act, 41 TEx. IN'r'L L.J. 103 (2006) (arguing Bautista and a Fifth Circuit case which
reached the same result should be overturned).
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The Thomas court explicitly noted, though, that:
Our opinion has no bearing on the holding of Lobo.... [I]n Lobo, the
arbitration provision stated the arbitral forum would be either Miami,
FL or the seafarer's country of citizenship and did not specify that
only foreign law would apply.... [Here], the narrow holding is that
the Convention does govern but, applying its affirmative defenses
provision, we find that the particular arbitration clause in question is
null and void as a matter of public policy.78
The inconsistency between Bautista and Lobo on the one hand and
Thomas on the other lurks not in the Convention's legal effect on the
seaman's exemption, but in the wider debate as to whether greater pro-
tections, in part against unfair bargaining power, should be available to
vulnerable classes of persons, such as seamen.
79
Perhaps even more striking with respect to the interplay between
Thomas and prior Eleventh Circuit precedent is reconciling Thomas with
Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London.80 In Lipcon, the Eleventh
Circuit held U.S. investors to their bargain, stating, "[w]e will not invali-
date choice clauses, however, simply because the remedies available in
the contractually chosen forum are less favorable than those available in
the courts of the United States."8
In practice, perhaps the interplay of Thomas and Lobo will thus
result in the arbitration of Seaman's Wage Act claims where the arbitra-
tors will apply U.S. law or there is a possibility that they will; but, if
foreign law will apply, arbitration will never be permitted. Clearly
though, regardless of precisely how the cases play out, the holding in
Thomas will be quite a distance from "narrow."
V. ASSESSING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FOREIGN LAW
Following Thomas, the Southern District of Florida accepted a stip-
ulation by Carnival "that Panamanian law does not provide seamen with
a reasonable equivalent to the rights provided by the Seaman's Wage
78. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1124 n.17 (11th Cir. 2009).
79. See, e.g., Posting of Marc J. Goldstein to KluwerArbitrationBlog, http://kluwerarbitration
blog.com/blog/2009/08/26/eleventh-circuit-troubled-by-choice-of-law-not-choice-of-arbitration-
in-thomas-v-carnival/#comment-7705 (Aug. 31, 2009, 17:52 EST) ("[Clommon law notions of
unconscionability in some employment contracts motivated the Thomas decision."); Bautista, 396
F.3d at 1302 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that "state-law principles of unconscionability render
the resulting agreements unconscionable" because they "were put in a difficult take it or leave it
situation when presented with the terms of employment.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285 (11 th Cir. 1998).
81. Id. at 1297. See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Carnival Corp. v. Thomas, 130
S. Ct. 1157 (2010) (No. 09-646), 2009 WL 4402888, at *16 (arguing Lipcon and Thomas are
irreconcilably inconsistent).
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Act."'8 2 Based on this stipulation, it is reasonable to assume that Panama-
nian law does not make provision for "two days wages for each day
penalty is delayed" like the Seaman's Wage Act,83 a provision which
has been described as "capable of producing results that are 'both absurd
and palpably unjust.' "84 Interestingly, Carnival argued in the past that
relevant Panamanian law "specifically allow[s] another form of compen-
sation in lieu of hourly overtime wages."85 Regardless of the merits of a
comparison between Panamanian and U.S. seaman's remedies, a major
criticism of Thomas is that the court failed to consider whether a compa-
rable remedy would be available to Thomas under Panamanian law.86
If an analogous remedy were available to Thomas, the entire con-
cern of arbitration specifications "operat[ing] in tandem as a prospective
waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies" 87 would appear to
be vitiated. In other words, if Panamanian law made provision for
seamen who were not paid in a timely manner by ship owners, Thomas
would not need the protection of the Seaman's Wage Act. If the Court at
least commented on the comparability of Panamanian law, at least a
semblance of international comity could have been preserved (which in
no small part drove the results in Mitsubishi, Vimar, Lobo, and
Bautista).
Thus, determining whether Panama offered a similar remedy for
seamen should have been a crucial step in the Thomas court's inquiry,
yet the court implicitly assumed that Panamanian law would not be ade-
quate without addressing this issue. And, the court did not simply forget
to consider whether Panama provided similar remedies. The court cited
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Cho Yang Shipping Co.,8 noting that
the Ninth Circuit in that case "compell[ed] arbitration after finding
82. Kovacs v. Carnival Corp., No. 09-22630-CV, 2009 WL 4980277, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
21, 2009) (citation omitted).
83. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (2000).
84. Chung v. Overseas Navigation Co., 774 F.2d 1043, 1048 (11 th Cir. 1985) (quoting Griffin
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 586 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
85. Borcea v. Carnival Corp., 238 F.R.D. 664, 667 (S.D. Fla. 2006). But see Henry v. S/S
Bermuda Star, 863 F.2d 1225, 1231 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding Panama law requires seamen to be
"paid overtime with a surcharge of not less than 25% of the wages accrued"); United States v.
Seaboard Sur. Co., 239 F.2d 667, 669 (4th Cir. 1957) (Panamanian law requires "earned wages are
to be paid to crewmen in ports of discharge").
86. See Posting of Marc J. Goldstein to Marc J. Goldstein Arbitration Commentaries, http://
arbblog.lexmarc.us/2009/07/us-public-policy-as-basis-to-nullify-arbitration-agreement-beyond-
the-bounds-of-mitsubishi (July 7, 2009) ("But the court of appeals did not consider whether
Panama law might be capable of affording remedies comparable to those offered by the Seamen's
[sic] Wage Act."); Brubaker, supra note 8, at 314 ("One concern is that the court did not analyze
Panamanian law to determine whether a comparable remedy to the Seaman's Wage Act existed
before invalidating the arbitration agreement.").
87. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2009).
88. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cho Yang Shipping Co., 131 F.3d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1997).
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'uncontroverted evidence that Korean law will at least be as favorable to
plaintiff as COGSA." 89 Of course, federal courts are not required to
judicially notice foreign law-so this conspicuous omission in the
court's analysis could signal inadvertent failure by Carnival's attorneys
to brief the court on Panamanian seaman's remedies. Or, perhaps the
court merely felt entitled to conduct its analysis differently, brushing off
Fireman's Fund as nonbinding. Nevertheless, the court's refusal to
examine comparable Panamanian remedies after this citation of Fire-
man's Fund is at least curious, if not wholly unacceptable. Even the two
cases cited by the court prior to Fireman's Fund as instances of arbitra-
tion clauses acting as prospective waivers of statutory rights, Central
National-Gottesman v. MiV "Gertrude Oldendorff '90 and Nippon Fire
& Marine Insurance Co. v. MiV Spring Wave, 9' did so on the basis that
foreign law, or at least the manner in which foreign courts would
enforce particular provisions of the respective agreements, would limit
liability in violation of COGSA. The Thomas decision, however, goes a
step further. Rather than stating that application of relevant Panamanian
law would limit Carnival's liability under the Seaman's Wage Act, the
court determined that the mere fact that Thomas would not be able to
pursue a remedy under the Seaman's Wage Act was sufficient to hold
the arbitration clause "null and void." 92 This mode of analysis flies in
the face of Vimar, which the Thomas court so wholeheartedly felt sup-
ported its position, as Vimar stated "[t]he relevant question . . . is
whether the substantive law to be applied will reduce the carrier's obli-
gation to the cargo owner below what COGSA guarantees." 93
Foreign arbitration clauses are a division of forum selection
clauses.94 In forum selection clause cases, courts in other circuits have
explicitly required analysis of the foreign law that will be applied before
such a clause will be invalidated. In Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's,95 in which
a series of choice-of-law, choice-of-forum, and arbitration clauses were
89. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123 n.16 (brackets omitted).
90. Cent. Nat'l-Gottesman v. M/V "Gertrude Oldendorff", 204 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
91. Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. MV Spring Wave, 92 F. Supp. 2d 574, 575 (E.D. La.
2000).
92. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123-24.
93. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995).
94. Id. at 534 (1995) ("[F]oreign arbitration clauses are but a subset of foreign forum
selection clauses .... "); Cent. Nat'l-Gottesman, Inc. v. M/V "Gertrude Oldendorff," 204 F. Supp.
2d 675, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
95. Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Shell v. R.W.
Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1995) (after comparing relevant English law and
American law, rejecting the argument that forum selection clause should be invalidated on the
basis that remedies are not equivalent, since "the fact that parties will have to structure their case
differently ... is not a sufficient reason to defeat a forum selection clause.").
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at issue, the Second Circuit stated with respect to its public policy analy-
sis "if the Roby Names were able to show that available remedies in
England are insufficient to deter British issuers from exploiting Ameri-
can investors ... we would not hesitate to condemn the ... clauses as
against public policy. ' 96 While contracting around U.S. securities laws
implicates a separate set of concerns, and is not permitted at all in a
wholly domestic context, a direct comparison reveals that the Thomas
court's failure to pass upon the adequacy of Panamanian law prior to
declaring the arbitration clause "null and void" cannot be reconciled
with at least one other circuit's mode of analysis, despite the fact that in
international securities cases, analyzing the comparability of the foreign
law is a more explicit requirement. Ultimately, while Roby has been the
subject of much criticism, 97 it remains good law. Most, if not all, deci-
sions disagreeing with Roby have been withdrawn or reversed.98
Roby offers guidance in another significant respect, discussed in
greater detail infra Part VII. The Roby court also stated:
It defies reason to suggest that a plaintiff may circumvent forum
selection and arbitration clauses merely by stating claims under laws
not recognized by the forum selected in the agreement. A plaintiff
simply would have to allege violations of his country's tort law or his
country's statutory law or his country's property law in order to
render nugatory any forum selection clause that implicitly or explic-
itly required the application of the law of another jurisdiction. We
refuse to allow a party's solemn promise to be defeated by artful
pleading. In the absence of other considerations, the agreement to
submit to arbitration or the jurisdiction of the English courts must be
enforced even if that agreement tacitly includes the forfeiture of some
claims that could have been brought in a different forum.
9 9
This speaks to the very concern that results from the upheaval cre-
ated by Thomas. If no analysis of the comparability of applicable for-
eign law is required, it appears that agreements to arbitrate may now be
struck down upon a party's assertion that he or she seeks to pursue a
remedy under a federal statute instead of abiding by agreed-to terms. 1°°
96. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1365; Brubaker, supra note 8, at 314 (noting the inconsistency between
Thomas and Roby).
97. See, e.g., Darrell Hall, No Way Out: An Argument Against Permitting Parties to Opt Out
of U.S. Securities Law in International Transactions, 97 COLUM. L. Rv. 57, 74-78 (1997).
98. See, e.g., Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 107 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir. 1997),
withdrawn, Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998); Leslie v. Lloyd's of
London, No. H-90-1907, 1995 WL 661090, at *22 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 1995), rev'd, Haynsworth
v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997).
99. Roby, 996 F.2d at 1360-61 (citation omitted).
100. Posting of Paul Friedland & Kirsten Odynski, to KluwerArbitrationBlog, http://kluwer
arbitrationblog.comblog/2009/08/26/eleventh-circuit-troubled-by-choice-of-law-not-choice-of-
arbitration-in-thomas-v-camival/#comment-7705 (Aug. 26, 2009) ("Citing Thomas, parties may
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Indeed, Thomas is a premier example of how "[t]he potential for judicial
abuse of the public policy exception significantly undermines the foun-
dations of international arbitration.""1 ' Certainly, Thomas has revived
the evil reviled by the Supreme Court long ago in Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co.: "[Clourts of signatory countries in which an agreement to
arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be permitted to decline
enforcement of such agreements on the basis of parochial views of their
desirability or in a manner that would diminish the mutually binding
nature of the agreements."'' 02
Roby, not cited by Thomas, also cited Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute1°3 for the proposition that forum selection clauses may be "unrea-
sonable" where "the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law may
deprive the plaintiff of a remedy ... . o While Roby considered this
separate from its determination of whether the clauses at issue violated
U.S. public policy, the existence of this ground for unreasonableness
further evidences the problematic nature of the Thomas court's failure to
assess Panamanian seamen's remedies. This ground indicates the propri-
ety of a comparison between the foreign law and the U.S. statutory rem-
edy in the determination of whether an agreement to arbitrate under
foreign law violates U.S. public policy. Where such a comparison is
absent, as in Thomas, the public policy violation becomes the mere
inability to bring a U.S. claim-which gives all U.S. statutory remedies
equivalent social value.
Rampant consequences are becoming apparent as lower courts
begin to interpret Thomas and as attorneys begin to cite Thomas for the
proposition that a foreign choice-of-law clause should be struck down if
it might cause an inability to seek a remedy under any federal statute.
Particularly, lower courts are citing Thomas yet irreconcilably also look-
ing at whether the foreign law to be applied provides comparable reme-
dies to those provided by the relevant U.S. federal statute.
seek to avoid otherwise valid arbitration agreements simply by declaring their intention to bring a
claim based on a U.S. statute.").
101. Hans Smit, Comments on Public Policy in International Arbitration, 13 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 65, 66 (2002) ("As long as judicial efforts to protect losers in arbitration from enforcement
of awards rendered against them by recourse to local notions of public policy that could not pass
muster under international standards persist, the basic scheme of the New York Convention is
dealt a heavy blow.").
102. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
103. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
104. Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993).
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In Kovacs v. Carnival Corp.,l"' the Southern District of Florida,
reaching the same conclusion as Thomas, nevertheless based its decision
on defendant's concession "that Panamanian law does not provide
seamen with a reasonable equivalent to the rights provided by the Sea-
man's Wage Act."' 6 Far more significant, though, is the Kovacs court's
rejection of defendant's subsequent argument that "Thomas does not
preclude the application of Panamanian law in the arbitration of other
U.S. statutory rights, such as the Jones Act."' 07 The court then also con-
cluded that Panamanian law did not provide a reasonable equivalent to
the rights provided by the Jones Act. While at least the Kovacs court
compared the right at issue with the appropriate foreign law, Kovacs
confirms that Thomas' extension of the "prospective waiver" doctrine
may go far beyond the Seaman's Wage Act to all U.S. statutory rights.
And in Sorica v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., the district court, relying
on Thomas, would not compel arbitration until Princess stipulated that
U.S. law would apply to the arbitral proceedings in Bermuda so that the
plaintiff would not forego her statutory rights under the Jones Act.108
Along these lines, perhaps the Thomas holding will be confined to
cases in which the statutory remedy to be foregone has some relation to
admiralty, but Thomas provides no principled basis for so limiting
itself.109
VI. A SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY FOR REVIEW?
Critical to the Thomas court's holding was its assertion that
Thomas would have no "subsequent opportunity for review."11 The
105.
106. Kovacs v. Carnival Corp., No. 09-22630-CV, 2009 WL 4980277, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
21, 2009).
107. Id.
108. Sorica v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. 09-CV-20917-CIV-Huck (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4,
2009).
109. See Brubaker, supra note 8, at 316 ("[T]he Eleventh Circuit's terse recitation of the facts
does not readily provide a basis for distinguishing the case. That this case arose in the employment
context and called for arbitration in a foreign country seems irrelevant because the Eleventh
Circuit's decision does not provide any basis to conclude that these factors are significant.").
110. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1123-24 (11 th Cir. 2009). The court opined:
Moreover, there is no assurance of an 'opportunity for review' of Thomas's
Seaman's Wage Act claim. Although we are at an interlocutory stage, the
possibility of any later opportunity presupposes that arbitration will produce some
award which the plaintiff can seek to enforce. But, in accordance with our holdings
above, in this case Thomas would only be arbitrating a single issue-the Seaman's
Wage Act claim, one derived solely from a U.S. statutory scheme. If, applying
Panamanian law, Thomas receives no award in the arbitral forum-a distinct
possibility given the U.S. based nature of his claim-he will have nothing to
enforce in U.S. courts, which will be deprived of any later opportunity to review.
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court presupposed that in order for review of any arbitral award to occur,
there must be an arbitral award to review. 1 ' This is incorrect for several
reasons.
Professor Alan Rau has indicated one way review could occur.
Thomas could simply ignore the arbitral award rendered (or lack
thereof) and bring his Seaman's Wage Act "claim in a U.S. court.""' 2
Then, Carnival would likely present the arbitral award, or decision not to
render an award, "as a defense to the suit, and ask that it be 'recognized'
under the [New York] Convention."1"3 Thomas would thus be provided
with a forum to argue that recognition is unwarranted as contrary to
public policy under Article V of the New York Convention." 4 Another
commentator has described this possibility slightly differently: Thomas
"could, after the arbitration, commence a separate action to assert a Sea-
man's Wage Act claim in federal court, and the court would have the
ability to deny res judicata effect to the award and to vacate in part its
earlier order sending the claim to arbitration.""' 5 Even the Supreme
Court in Mitsubishi recognized that if particular statutory provisions are
not taken into account during arbitration, there could be, at least poten-
tially, a subsequent suit in a United States court. In footnote nineteen
itself, the Mitsubishi court wrote "[n]or need we consider now the effect
of an arbitral tribunal's failure to take cognizance of the statutory cause
of action on the claimant's capacity to reinitiate suit in federal court."" ' 6
Therefore, the Thomas court erred by simply failing to consider how
proceedings could be initiated in federal court following arbitration,
instead opting for a conclusory assertion that Thomas would lose and be
left with zero options." 7
It is not entirely clear whether the Thomas court would have
reached a different result had it realized that a subsequent opportunity
for review would be available in this manner. Of course, if recognition
of this possibility would have mitigated the court's concerns to the point
where it could tolerate enforcement of the arbitration clause, its failure
111. Id.
112. Posting of Alan Rau to KluwerArbitrationBlog, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/
2009/08/26/eleventh-circuit-troubled-by-choice-of-law-not-choice-of-arbitration-in-thomas-v-
carnivall#comment-7705 (Sept. 2, 2009, 21:03 EST). See also Brubaker, supra note 8, at 316
(making the same point and also noting that "Carnival Corporation could waive the adverse
arbitral award and defend the statutory claim on the merits," and "Thomas cannot complain" if
this option is taken).
113. Brubaker, supra note 8, at 316.
114. Brubaker, supra note 8, at 316.
115. Posting of Marc J. Goldstein to Marc J. Goldstein Arbitration Commentaries, http://
arbblog.lexmarc.us/2009/07/us-public-policy-as-basis-to-nullify-arbitration-agreement-beyond-
the-bounds-of-mitsubishi (July 7, 2009).
116. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
117. Thomas v. Carnival Corp. 573 F.3d 1113, 1123-24 (11 th Cir. 2009).
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to recognize that review might occur via an independent Seaman's Wage
Act claim following arbitration becomes more problematic. But, the
court's mode of analysis indicates it had deemed the clause a "prospec-
tive waiver" prior to its incorrect determination that there would be no
"subsequent opportunity for review."" 8 This is evidenced by its legisla-
tive finding that "[t]he [Supreme] Court, then, has held that arbitration
clauses should be upheld if it is evident that either U.S. law definitely
will be applied or if, there is a possibility that it might apply and there
will be later review."'' 19 As stated, the court first found that Panamanian
law would apply to the arbitral proceedings to the categorical exclusion
of U.S. law, resulting in an "inability to bring a Seaman's Wage Act
claim [which] certainly qualifies as a 'prospective waiver' of
rights .... "120 Hence, finding that U.S. law would not apply, it appears
that the court could have refrained from passing on the availability of a
subsequent opportunity for review. The secondary importance of the
court's finding of a lack of such subsequent opportunity for review is
supported by the court's use of the term "moreover" preceding its brief
assessment of the point.
Interestingly, on the other hand, had the court applied the Vimar
dicta directly, its incorrect finding that there would be no subsequent
opportunity for review would be of much greater significance.12'
According to the Vimar dicta, invalidation requires that the arbitration
requirements serve as a "prospective waiver of ... statutory remedies"
and there be no "subsequent opportunity for review." '22 By looking at
the precise facts of Vimar and Mitsubishi, then, the Thomas court cre-
ated its own strained hierarchy between these two factors, rather than
considering them as separate elements as directed by the Vimar dicta.
And by relegating the possibility of a subsequent opportunity for review
to secondary importance, the Thomas court's incorrect assertion that
there would be no such opportunity is less troublesome legally, at least
within its fabricated structure. It is of course troubling regardless to
those who expect judges to pick up on such an easily noticeable possibil-
ity for later review. But if the Thomas court had looked at whether the
agreement served as a prospective waiver and the possibility of a later
opportunity for review as separate, equal elements, as it should have,
118. Id. at 1124.
119. Id. at 1123.
120. Id.
121. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995)
("Were there no subsequent opportunity for review and were we persuaded that the 'the choice-of-
forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to
pursue statutory remedies..., we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as
against public policy.") (ellipsis in original).
122. Id.
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this incorrect determination would be even more legally awkward
because it would bear more directly on the result. The idea underlying
the "opportunity for review" phrase of the Vimar dicta is that even if
arbitration specifications result in a party foregoing potential statutory
remedies, subsequent opportunity for review could fix this, and arbitra-
tion should proceed. The Thomas court's failure to at least adhere to the
text of the Vimar dicta neglects this.
VII. Do ALL FEDERAL STATUTORY REMEDIES HAVE EQUIVALENT
SOCIAL VALUE?
As argued by one observer, the Thomas court's reliance on Mitsub-
ishi implicates a fundamental problem: "U.S. law per Mitsubishi is in
harmony with transnational principles that only an offense against fun-
damental (and some would say international) public policy will result in
invalidation of an arbitration agreement or denial of recognition of an
award under the Convention."'' 23 Few would dispute the classification of
U.S. antitrust law as a "fundamental" public policy. Thus, the Supreme
Court's concern in Mitsubishi with whether U.S. law would apply in a
Japanese arbitral tribunal was justified because of the importance of
antitrust law to desired U.S. economic normative structure. The Sea-
man's Wage Act, on the other hand, "cannot be so easily defended"'1
24
inasmuch as it simply does not affect a societal segment of comparable
size.
By citing to Mitsubishi's "prospective waiver" dicta as the primary
basis underlying its result, then, the Thomas decision treats all federal
statutory remedies equivalently in terms of their social, economic, and
normative value to society. In reality, though, while difficult if not
impossible to quantify, federal remedies possess differing amounts of
each of these types of value. Very serious and difficult questions arise
with respect to whether "social value" is a proper consideration in the
context of subject-matter arbitrability, and if it is, with respect to who
should make these value-determinations. At least one commentator has
argued that "[c]ourts cannot readily rank the importance of federal stat-
utes to the public interest or guess the respective protection that Con-
gress intended for each statute."' 25 This is correct insofar as any ranking
of various federal statutory remedies in terms of societal importance
would be easily subject to criticism-who is to say, other than perhaps
123. Posting of Marc J. Goldstein to KluwerArbitrationBlog, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
blog/2009/08/26/eleventh-circuit-troubed-by-chice-f-law-not-chice-f-arbitration-in-thomas
v-camival/#comment-7705 (Aug. 31, 2009, 17:52 EST).
124. Brubaker, supra note 8, at 314.
125. Brubaker, supra note 8, at 314.
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Congress itself, that one class of interests benefits collective American
welfare more than another? There is democratic merit in preventing
appointed federal judges, who may on occasion act in accordance with
personal motivations and biases (notwithstanding whether tenure theo-
retically prevents such arbitrary decision-making) from making this
determination.
VIII. HIERARCHY OF U.S. MANDATORY LAW IN TERMS OF
NORMATIVE VALUE
Still, nowhere is the establishment of such a hierarchy prohibited. If
limited to the context of determining whether to enforce an arbitration
clause or an arbitral award on the basis of public policy, a hierarchy of
the social value of federal statutory remedies could serve a useful pur-
pose in this now-confused area of the law. Thus, this Part seeks to rec-
ommend a potential hierarchy that federal courts could use to consider
relative normative value to United States society when determining
whether to invalidate an agreement to arbitrate on public policy grounds
(or enforce an award after the fact). Of course, even if empowered to do
so, a federal court would not have occasion in a particular case to estab-
lish this hierarchy on its own, as it would entail discussion of numerous
statutes and varying public policies. Congress itself could probably cre-
ate such a normative hierarchy. But, in an era of unprecedented attempts
at rule harmonization at an international level, Congress might be
unwisely distancing itself from other states. This is why, assuming that
any "ranking of public policies" is possible at an international level it
should be in the form of a recommendation by an organization such as
the International Council for Commercial Arbitration. Nevertheless, for
purposes of this Part, the proposed hierarchy will consider what the
United States might consider a principled hierarchy.
This exercise, however, requires clear distinctions between domes-
tic and international transactions. While the relative normative value of
each of these statutory remedies does not differ to the American public
based on whether a given transaction is domestic or international, in the
international setting, the need for certainty and the necessity of interna-
tional comity are more likely to render concerns of domestic normative
value less relevant.1
26
Finally, and regrettably, because this note focuses on the Thomas
decision, each of the areas of law below is discussed in a relatively cur-
126. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-16 (1974) (noting that an
international "contract involves considerations and policies significantly different than those
found" in a contract in which it is undisputed that only U.S. law will apply).
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sory manner. Surely the normative value of each and its relationship to
arbitration could warrant an entire article.
A. Civil Rights
Federal courts should be most reluctant to allow a party to lose
federal statutory rights via operation of a choice-of-law clause in an
arbitration agreement in the case of certain civil rights. 27 Even though
the trend favoring arbitrability has encompassed claims under many civil
rights statutes, discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, relig-
ion, or creed is directly repugnant to the notion of equal protection under
the law that the United States prides itself on. Heightened scrutiny is
therefore justified before compelling arbitration of these claims simply
due to the national interest in seeing them resolved before an Article InI
court. 28 This is not to say that arbitrators are more likely to lack compe-
tence than judges in deciding civil rights claims. But insofar as "broad
social-ordering" has caused courts in the past to categorically exempt
particular subject areas from arbitration, 29 the imperative role played by
civil rights statutes in the American public's overwhelming desire for
protected grounds to remain protected militates in favor of a heightened
level of scrutiny in the case of civil rights statutes.
The seminal case evincing this explosive level of normative value
is Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.'30 While Alexander did not possess
an international component, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior hold-
ing that "an employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of
prospective waiver," and while it did not hold that Title VII claims can-
not be arbitrated, it preserved employee rights to sue in court following
arbitration.' 3 ' The semantic phrasing of the quoted sentence indicates
127. See, e.g., Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrability in Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation:
The Need for Amendment, 26 CONN. L. REV. 521, 584 (1994) ("[Some] civil rights
claims... require thoughtful development of existing legal doctrine once the facts are determined;
here the federal judiciary's ultimate oversight remains particularly critical."); id. (arguing for "a
right to a post-arbitral trial de novo on claims under any of the four statutes touched by the Acts"
based on "the role of civil rights legislation as public mandates designed to produce equality
before the law.").
128. Of course, it is arguable that the unique significance of the norms embodied by U.S. civil
rights statutes is universally recognized. If this is so, the probability that an arbitrator will
consider substantive civil rights claims is high, either because a U.S. civil rights act is considered
mandatory or because an international treaty will be applied to reach the same result.
129. Posting of Marc J. Goldstein to Marc J. Goldstein Arbitration Commentaries, http://
arbblog.lexmarc.us/2009107/us-public-policy-as-basis-to-nullify-arbitration-agreement-beyond-
the-bounds-of-mitsubishi (July 7, 2009).
130. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52-54 (1974) (holding that "a contractual
right to submit a claim to arbitration is not displaced simply because Congress has also provided a
statutory fight against discrimination" thereby allowing an employee to arbitrate and sue in court).
131. Id. at 51-52 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
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the importance of nondiscrimination (in employment) to U.S. values as a
whole. By contrast, substituting "the Seaman's Wage Act" for "Title
VII" in the quoted sentence seems more suspect, yet this is effectively
what Thomas did. Critical to the placement of civil rights claims as justi-
fying the highest level of scrutiny is the fact that Alexander has never
been explicitly overruled. Notably, though the Supreme Court's recent
5-4 decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, involving the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, distinguished Alexander on the basis that
there, the employee had not agreed to arbitrate his statutory claims, only
his contractual claims. 32 Pyett thus eliminated what appeared to be the
last bastion of a subject matter which arguably stood exempt from arbi-
tration, and seriously limited Alexander. Nonetheless, simply as a result
of the goal of creating a society founded upon equality, agreements to
arbitrate civil rights claims should be subject to the highest level of scru-
tiny before arbitration is compelled.
B. Antitrust
Even under contemporary U.S. economic values, The Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act still present crucial regulatory tools. Put simply,
they reflect the well-regarded repugnance to situations where intra-
industry competition, theoretically beneficial for the individual con-
sumer, is stifled by monopoly. Mitsubishi is the paramount case dealing
with the permissibility of the arbitration of antitrust claims. Certainly,
Mitsubishi permitted arbitration of an antitrust dispute, not least because
"American law applied to the antitrust claims and . . .the claims had
been submitted to the arbitration panel in Japan on that basis."' 33 Yet,
the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi recognized "the fundamental impor-
tance to American democratic capitalism of the regime of the antitrust
laws."' 34 Mitsubishi further expressed respect for the importance of the
antitrust laws "to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system,"' 35 and noted that "the Sherman and Clayton Acts
reflect Congress' appraisal of the value of economic freedom."' 36 Amer-
ican Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., though greatly lim-
ited by Mitsubishi itself, identified the incalculable normative
Congressional judgment underlying the antitrust laws by concluding that
"the pervasive public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and
the nature of the claims that arise in such cases, combine to make the
132. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1468-69 (2009). See also Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
133. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
134. Id. at 634.
135. id. at 651 (quoting United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).
136. Id. at 652.
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.. . .antitrust claims raised here . . . inappropriate for arbitration."'' 37
What this language reveals (even if American Safety is arguably
obsolete), besides simply that the antitrust laws exist to vindicate a legis-
lative determination of an essential public interest, is a justification for a
significantly heightened level of public policy scrutiny in the case of an
agreement to arbitrate which might exempt an alleged antitrust violator
from the payment of punitive damages.
Again, the difficulty in establishing a "hierarchy of normative
value" is made clear by the fragility of the argument that antitrust claims
are more amenable to arbitration than civil rights claims (such as under
Title VII), and less amenable to arbitration than securities claims. All the
same, the persistent bias against monopoly does render the antitrust laws
of particular importance in overall U.S. public policy. Noticeably, the
provision of the Seaman's Wage Act at issue in Thomas seeks to incen-
tivize ship owners to pay their sailors quickly-a rather less lofty goal
than setting a limit on organizational structures and policies of all U.S.
companies.
C. Securities and RICO
The United States has a strong public policy in favor of "pro-
tect[ing] .. .investors against fraud and nondisclosure."' 38 But in spite
of this governmental desire to provide an investor haven, when concrete
disputes have arisen the policy has often given way to international com-
ity where the remedies available in arbitration might be comparable.'
39
Arbitration, in both the domestic and international contexts, has demon-
strated a unique, mutually beneficial ability to deal with these claims. 40
It is this judicial willingness to send these claims to arbitration which
justifies securities arbitration's placement of third on the list. Admit-
tedly, there is a potential problem with using instances in which courts
compelled arbitration as evidence of less importance to be attributed to a
137. Am. Safety Equip. Co. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968). But
see Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Arbitral Injustice-Rethinking the Manifest Disregard Standard for
Judicial Review of Awards, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 283, 285 n.9 (2007) (citing decisions which
hold even domestic antitrust claims arbitrable).
138. Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing Bonny v.
Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993)).
139. See, e.g., Bonny, 3 F.3d at 156 ("Given the international nature of the transactions
involved here, and the availability of remedies under British law that do not offend the policies
behind the securities laws, the parties' forum selection and choice of law provisions contained in
the agreements should be given effect."); Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir.
1996); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998).
140. See generally Brandon M. Thompson, Note, Answering a Call that was Never Made: The
Unwarranted Congressional Assault on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 64 U.
MIAMi L. REV. 339, 357-61 (2009) (describing fairness guarantees in consumer-securities
arbitration).
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given subject-matter, but at the same time, judicial willingness might
serve as an indication of the relative importance that Congress wished to
place on particular statutes in the context of determining arbitrability.
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, Justice
O'Connor rejected the plaintiffs' argument that arbitration "effects an
impermissible waiver of the substantive protections of the [Securities]
Exchange Act," and also held the plaintiffs claims under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") arbitrable. 4 ' The
Supreme Court reaffirmed the RICO holding in PacifiCare Health Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Book, which compelled physicians' RICO claims against
managed-health-care organizations to be arbitrated in spite of the possi-
bility that the parties' agreement might have limited the punitive damage
liability of the health-care organizations ordinarily available under
RICO.142 These cases, while compelling arbitration, do not render the
public policies enunciated in the Securities Exchange Act and RICO
unimportant; they merely reflect a recognition, as did Mitsubishi, that
arbitrators are capable of adjudicating in a way that will take into
account the public policies reflected by the statutes' enactment.
But, on the other hand, it can reasonably be surmised that much of
the American public feels quite strongly against racketeers investing in
enterprises engaged in interstate or foreign commerce,143 as well as
against securities "fraud on the market" and insider trading." And to
the extent there is simply a public interest in having Article III courts
resolve disputes which implicate the fundamental foundations of Ameri-
can society' 45 regardless of arbitrators' actual capabilities, some scrutiny
of both procedural and substantive guarantees of fairness is necessary
before compelling arbitration on a whim in these cases. Not quite so,
however, with respect to the less publicly significant Seaman's Wage
Act.
D. Consumer Protection
Due in part to the cosmic increase in the number of Internet trans-
actions over the last two decades,' 4 6 a slightly lower level of judicial
141. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987).
142. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406-07 (2003).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
145. See Kronstein, supra note 2, at 68 ("To effect protection of individuals against the
unlawful exercise of 'judicial power,' the scope of the due process clause must not be limited to
acts of formal 'judicial' bodies. It must include acts of organizations which attempt to usurp
judicial power.... [T]he public and the government should be assured that organized arbitration
does not violate principles of law, social justice and national interest.").
146. Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the Have-Nots in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.
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scrutiny is justified where a consumer may be forced to lose the right to
recover under a federal statute in favor of arbitration. This is so because
with this increase, "international arbitration, particularly online dispute
resolution, is often touted as the only viable means for consumers to
pursue claims." 147 Indeed, consumer advocacy groups themselves have
"urged the use of arbitration for these cross-border disputes." 148
Domestically speaking, the two Supreme Court cases which touch
on the benefits of consumer arbitration, and hence the need for less scru-
tiny are Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute'49 and Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson. 5' While Shute's assertion that "passengers who
purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in this case
benefit in the form of reduced fares"15 seems dubious, these cases indi-
cate the expansive reading that the Court has given to the Federal Arbi-
tration Act. In this regard, if the Court is viewed as an espouser of
congressional intent, protecting consumers from arbitration is not a high
congressional priority. Accordingly, some, but less, scrutiny is needed in
the case of such agreements to arbitrate disputes between consumers and
the firms from which they purchase goods and services. On the other
hand, many commentators have lashed out at the U.S. approach to
mandatory consumer arbitration or at least urged Congress to reexamine
the desirability of this endemic phenomenon. 
152
Further justifying this relatively lower level of scrutiny is the pro-
position that the concept of mandatory consumer law is not conducive to
the antiregulatory environment of the United States.' 53 In addition, Pro-
fessor Keith Hylton undertook a mathematical analysis and determined
that from an economic perspective, consumer arbitration agreements
should generally be enforced because:
J. 341, 361 (2007) ("[W]ith the lowering of trade barriers and the advent of the Internet,
consumers are increasingly purchasing across national borders.").
147. Id.
148. Id. See also Karen Stewart & Joseph Matthews, Online Arbitration of Cross-Border,
Business to Consumer Disputes, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2002) (noting "the difficulty
inherent in applying domestic laws to electronic commerce .... ").
149. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
150. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). Accord Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
151. Shute, 499 U.S. at 594.
152. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 831 (2002); William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for
FAA Reform, 56 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1241, 1311 (2003) ("[F]or consumer transactions and
employment contracts ... heightened court scrutiny provides a healthy measure of paternalistic
protection for the weaker party.").
153. See Patrick J. Borchers, Categorical Exceptions to Party Autonomy in Private
International Law, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1645 (2008).
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[Parties] will enter into a waiver agreement when and only when the
option to litigate reduces wealth, which is true when the deterrence
benefits provided by the threat of litigation are less than expected
litigation costs. Similarly, parties have an incentive to enter into an
arbitration agreement when and only when the margin between deter-
rence benefits and dispute resolution costs is larger under the arbitra-
tion regime. In view of the benefits to the contracting parties, and the
widely-dispersed gains from relieving courts of the burdens imposed
by wealth-reducing litigation, there should be a presumption in favor
of enforcing waiver and arbitration agreements that are entered into
in a knowing and voluntary manner.
154
E. Non-Civil Rights Employment
Agreements to arbitrate claims in the employment context that do
not involve civil rights statutes need only be subject to minimal scrutiny
by courts before arbitration is compelled. This is partially demonstrated
by the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Mazera v. Varsity Ford Mgmt.
Servs."'55 While Mazera actually involved claims under civil rights stat-
utes, the court's language indicates judicial and congressional endorse-
ment of rejection of the usual criticisms of mandatory employment
arbitration. The court opined, "[a]lthough Mazera's affidavit raises sev-
eral factual issues-his lack of bargaining power, the absence of an
attorney, language problems, and his degree of understanding of the con-
tract-none of these statements is material with respect to the validity of
the arbitration agreement."'' 56 Moreover, it is undisputed that wage
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") are arbitrable.
157
The lesser normative value to be attributed to the FLSA relative to stat-
utes such as Title VII is arguably further indicated by Congress' omis-
sion in the FLSA of the protection that waivers of rights need be
"knowing and voluntary."' 58 The Seaman's Wage Act possesses a nor-
mative similarity to the FLSA, and is best thought of as falling into this
last category.
In the international cross-border employment context, one scholar
has argued that "litigation in national courts" may not adequately con-
sider the conflicting policies of the employee's state and the employer's
state, and hence that "arbitration may provide a more viable mechanism
for safeguarding national interests represented in employment laws, and
154. Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. EcON. REv. 209, 263 (2000).
155. Mazera v. Varsity Ford Mgmt. Servs., 565 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2009).
156. Id. at 1002 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
157. See, e.g., Skirchak v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 508 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2007).
158. Id. at 57.
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for finding a meaningful accommodation of conflicting national
laws."' 59 This provides a further justification for less scrutiny, and is
directly relevant to Thomas-if arbitration in the Philippines were
allowed, the Filipino policy of encouraging the hiring of its nationals
abroad 6 ' and the U.S. policy of ensuring prompt payment to seaman
could be appropriately reconciled.
IX. CONCLUSION
A quarter-century ago, the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi recognized
that:
If [international arbitral tribunals] are to take a central place in the
international legal order, national courts will need to shake off the old
judicial hostility to arbitration, and also their customary and under-
standable unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under
domestic law to a foreign or transnational tribunal. To this extent, at
least, it will be necessary for national courts to subordinate domestic
notions of arbitrability to the international policy favoring commer-
cial arbitration.
16
By holding Thomas's agreement to arbitrate under Panamanian law a
prospective waiver of his right to a remedy under the Seaman's Wage
Act in United States courts, the Eleventh Circuit has revived this feared
"old judicial hostility." It is in this vein that Chief Justice Taft's quote is
relevant. Certainty touts enormous benefits which can frequently over-
come even the strongest arguments supporting access to judicially-sup-
plied remedies for the "little guy." While the result in Thomas is
admirable insofar as it addresses the vulnerability concerns intrinsic to
seamen as a class, avoiding uncertainty by enforcing arbitration agree-
ments in commercial contracts must win out.
159. Rogers, supra note 146, at 361.
160. Nickson, supra note 77, at 105.
161. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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